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Publication history

First published February 2014

Foreword

This PAS was sponsored by the Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST). Its development was facilitated by BSI Standards Limited and published under licence from The British Standards Institution. It came into effect on 28 February 2014.

BSI wishes to acknowledge the following organizations that were involved in the development of this PAS as members of the steering group:

Airlock Aviation
BAA
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
Department for Transport
Glasgow 2014 Ltd
Home Office
Iconal Technology Ltd
Metropolitan Police Service
Security Industry Authority
Security Institute
Sodexo

Wider comments from other interested parties were invited by BSI. The expert contributions made by the organizations and individuals consulted in the development of this PAS are gratefully acknowledged.

The British Standards Institution retains ownership and copyright of this PAS. BSI Standards Limited as the publisher of the PAS reserves the right to withdraw or amend this PAS on receipt of authoritative advice that it is appropriate to do so. This PAS will be reviewed at intervals not exceeding two years, and any amendments arising from the review will be published as an amended PAS and publicized in Update Standards.

The PAS process enables a specification to be developed rapidly in order to fulfil an immediate need in industry. A PAS may be considered for further development as a British Standard, or constitute part of the UK input into the development of a European or International Standard.

Use of this document

It has been assumed in the preparation of this PAS that the execution of its provisions will be entrusted to appropriately qualified and experienced people, for whose use it has been produced.

Presentational conventions

The provisions of this PAS are presented in roman (i.e. upright) type. Its recommendations are expressed in sentences in which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”. The use of the auxiliary verb “can” indicates that something is technically possible and the auxiliary verb “may” indicates permission.

Commentary, explanation and general informative material is presented in smaller italic type, and does not constitute a normative element.

Spelling conforms to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. If a word has more than one spelling, the first spelling is used.

Contractual and legal considerations

This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application.

Compliance with this PAS does not itself confer immunity from legal obligations.

This document has been prepared for guidance only. Whilst considerable care has been taken in preparing the information contained within it, no responsibility or liability is accepted for any injury, loss or damage incurred as a result of any use or reliance upon the same. Adherence to the guidance does not ensure compliance with relevant legal obligations. If in doubt users should take appropriate advice. The guidance is a living document and may be revised periodically as necessary.

Introduction

An unfortunate feature of modern society is that buildings, sites, sporting and other public events may be targets for terrorist or other malicious attacks. It is necessary to remain vigilant to prevent such attacks as well as to protect people and infrastructure from their effects.

This PAS is the first publication of its kind to present guidance on good practice for checkpoint security screening of people and their belongings in buildings and at large events. It has been developed using information derived from a wide range of security experts in industry, government, academia and law enforcement agencies.

Insufficient or inappropriate security measures may be ineffective at reducing the risk of adverse incidents and in some cases may even increase this risk. Conversely, excessive measures will result in unnecessary expense and use of staff and space, and are likely to interfere with the normal functioning of the site or event being protected.

This PAS addresses the scarcity of information on checkpoint security screening in non-regulated environments. It aims to give guidance on good practice for setting up checkpoint security systems in public spaces, government and other sensitive buildings, secure sites, large sporting and other public events. A complete process is outlined, from assessing the risk, establishing security requirements and selecting screening strategies through to the deployment of suitable methods and equipment. Although the main focus is on permanent checkpoints, the same underlying principles apply to the installation of temporary checkpoints, for example, at large public events. This specification should be useful to all those responsible for designing and delivering security systems and procedures for checkpoint screening. It will also be of interest to equipment manufacturers, procurement managers, policy makers and the Government.

Security is a complex issue. Security screening may be regarded as a system, the function of which is dependent on its components, the interactions between them and the environment. Therefore a systems approach has been used in this PAS. It considers people, processes, information and technologies.

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1 Scope

This PAS gives guidance and recommendations for checkpoint security screening of people, and their bags and possessions, for non-regulated applications. This includes both permanent and temporary installations at government and private buildings, events and sporting venues in public spaces or on private land. The PAS focuses on the detection of weapons and explosive threat items but the methodology can equally be applied to address other threats that an organization may face.

This PAS is primarily aimed at anyone who has responsibility for planning and/or delivering security operations at venues in either the private or public sector. It will also be of interest to equipment manufacturers, procurement managers and policy makers. This document provides a framework for assessing risk and identifying screening requirements, and then specifying and delivering appropriate solutions. Key benefits and limitations of common screening methods and technologies are also summarized. The PAS has been deliberately kept flexible; users may tailor the recommendations to suit the particular requirements of their own organization or event, whilst still adhering to the principles of good practice.

Security checkpoints rarely operate in isolation; recommendations for checkpoint screening are presented in the wider context of the organization’s security systems as a whole. These systems may, for example, include physical security measures such as closed-circuit TV surveillance (CCTV), and access control and personnel security, which may include accreditation of staff and visitors.

Security staff form an integral part of any security system. Staff responsibilities are considered at all levels, from senior managers responsible for security or the commissioning of security services, through to the staff who carry out screening of individuals and bags or possessions. The importance of effective and relevant training of staff, maintaining staff motivation and ongoing monitoring of performance is also discussed.

Aviation and other transport security screening are outside the scope of the PAS since these are subject to separate national and international regulation. However, it is important to note that nothing in the current PAS conflicts with well-established aviation security screening procedures. Rather this document seeks to build on the best practices of aviation and other regulated transport security and to apply these to the non-regulated environment where appropriate. Where gaps have been identified new guidance is provided.

Whilst the prime focus of the PAS is screening for explosives and weapons, the screening procedures described can be adapted to detect or mitigate other types of threat such as:

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) materials;
other illicit substances, such as narcotics;
other items or materials that the organization might wish to prohibit on safety or security grounds, such as alcohol or medicines;
items that may cause inconvenience or nuisance (such as musical instruments);
theft of physical assets;
industrial espionage;
public disorder or criminal activity.

This PAS does not cover:

vehicle screening;
mail screening (this is covered in PAS 97:2012, A specification for mail screening and security);
defensive search of buildings or sites.
NOTE Although specific CBRN screening technologies and methods are beyond the scope of this PAS, measures associated with screening for explosives and weapons can also reduce the risk of CBRN threat items. If, following risk assessment, CBRN threat items are considered likely, expert advice should be sought.

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2 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

3 Outline of process

4 Assessing the risk

4.1 General

4.2 Risk assessment process

4.3 Recording and presenting the results

4.4 Risk management and mitigation

4.5 Risk assessment review

5 Checkpoint screening requirements

5.1 General

5.2 People flows, throughput and belongings

5.3 Temporary checkpoints

5.4 Location of screening facilities

5.5 Associated security measures

5.6 Checkpoint layout

5.7 Recording the operational requirements

6 Screening strategies

6.1 General

6.2 Implementation

6.3 Managing fluctuations in demand

6.4 Future proofing

7 Technologies and methods

7.1 General

7.2 Screening technologies and methods

7.3 Combining detection technologies and methods

8 Implementation and deployment

8.1 General

8.2 General physical security measures

8.3 Management and responsibility

8.4 Operating procedures

8.5 Checkpoint design considerations

8.6 Equipment ownership considerations

8.7 Screening staff considerations

8.8 Health and safety

8.9 Security procedures

8.10 Authority and consent to screening

8.11 Privacy and ethical issues

9 Monitor effectiveness and review

9.1 General

9.2 Performance measures

9.3 Continuous performance monitoring

9.4 Periodic performance testing

Bibliography

PAS 127:2014

Checkpoint security screening of people and their belongings. Guide

Current

Published:

28 Feb 2014